

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Judaism

Mitzvos and Their Reasons

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MAY THEIR SOULS BE BOUND IN THE EVERLASTING BOND OF LIFE

Introduction to the Philosophy of Judaism

Mitzvos & Their Reasons Rabbi Dr. Tzvi H. Weinreb Institute for Jewish Continuity www.goijc.org 11/12/12

1. רמב"ם הלכות מעילה פרק ה הלכה ח

-המקדיש את היער מועלין בכולו בין באילנות בין בכל קן שבראש האילנות או שביניהן.

2. דברים פרק כב פסוק ו

כי יקרא קן צפור לפניך בדרך בכל עץ או על הארץ אפרחים או ביצים והאם רבצת על האפרחים או על הביצים לא תקח האם על הבנים:

3. רמב"ן דברים פרק כב פסוק ו

- א. (ו) כי יקרא קן צפור לפניך גם זו מצוה מבוארת מן אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד (ויקרא כב כח). כי הטעם בשניהם לבלתי היות לנו לב אכזרי ולא נרחם, או שלא יתיר הכתוב לעשות השחתה לעקור המין אף על פי שהתיר השחיטה במין ההוא, והנה ההורג האם והבנים ביום אחד או לוקח אותם בהיות להם דרור לעוף כאלו יכרית המין ההוא:
- ב. וכתב הרב במורה הנבוכים (ג מח) כי טעם שלוח הקן וטעם אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד, כדי להזהיר שלא ישחוט הבן בעיני האם כי יש לבהמות דאגה גדולה בזה, ואין הפרש בין דאגת האדם לדאגת הבהמות על בניהם, כי אהבת האם וחנותה לבני בטנה איננו נמשך אחרי השכל והדבור אבל הוא מפעולת כח המחשבה המצויה בבהמות כאשר היא מצויה באדם. ואם כן, אין עיקר האיסור באותו ואת כנו רק בבנו ואותו, אבל הכל הרחקה. ויותר נכון, בעבור שלא נתאכזר. ואמר הרב ואל תשיב עלי ממאמר החכמים (ברכות לג ב) האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך, כי זו אחת משתי סברות, סברת מי שיראה כי אין טעם למצות אלא חפץ הבורא, ואנחנו מחזיקים בסברא השניה שיהיה בכל המצות טעם. והוקשה עליו עוד מה שמצא בב"ר (מד א) וכי מה איכפת לו להקב"ה בין שוחט מן הצואר לשוחט מן העזרף, הא לא נתנו המצות אלא לצרף בהם את הבריות שנאמר (משלי ל ה) כל אמרת אלוה צרופה:
- ג. וזה הענין שגזר הרב במצות שיש להם טעם, מבואר הוא מאד כי בכל אחד טעם ותועלת ותקון לאדם, מלבד שכרן מאת המצוה בהן יתברך. וכבר ארז"ל (סנהדרין כא ב) מפני מה לא נתגלו טעמי תורה וכו', ודרשו (פסחים קיט א) ולמכסה עתיק, זה המגלה דברים שכסה עתיק יומין ומאי ניהו טעמי תורה. וכבר דרשו בפרה אדומה (במדב"ר יט ג ד), שאמר שלמה על הכל עמדתי, ופרשה של פרה אדומה חקרתי ושאלתי ופשפשתי, אמרתי אחכמה והיא רחוקה ממני (קהלת ז כג), ואמר ר' יוסי בר' חנינא אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא למשה לך אני מגלה טעם פרה אדומה אבל לאחרים חקה, דכתיב (זכריה יד ו) והיה ביום ההוא לא יהיה אור יקרות וקפאון, יקפאון כתיב, דברים המכוסים מכם בעולם הזה עתידין להיות צפויים לעולם הבא, כהדין סמיא דצפי, דכתיב (ישעיה מב טז) והולכתי עורים בדרך לא ידעו, וכתיב (שם) אלה הדברים עשיתים ולא עזבתים, שכבר עשיתים לר' עקיבא. הנה בארו שאין מניעות טעמי תורה ממנו אלא עורון בשכלנו, ושכבר נתגלה טעם החמורה שבהם לחכמי ישראל, וכאלה רבות בדבריהם, ובתורה ובמקרא דברים רבים מודיעין כן, והרב הזכיר מהן:

4. The Nineteen Letters: The World of Rabbi S.R. Hirsch



Mayan, vol. V, no. 4, 1965, pp. 50-51), Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's insistence that the slaughtering of sacrifices was not the main point of the sacrificial act is explained by the Zohar's statement that the kohanim should not do the slaughtering. Rabbi Elie Munk ("Rabbiner Hirsch als Rationalist der Kabbalah," NZ, III, 1933, pp. 54ff., quoted by Dayan Grunfeld in his discussion of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch and Kabbalah, IH, pp. cxx-cxxix) notes that Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's explanation of the symbolic significance of the numbers 6, 7 and 8 follows the interpretation of the Zohar. In fact, it is said that Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's personal siddur contained marginal notes of a kabbalistic nature. There is, therefore, no basis at all for the assertion that he rejected the basic approach of Kabbalah, i.e., its emphasis on the effect of religious actions upon supra-mundane spheres and their mystical significance in eliciting Divine responses.

Why, then, did Rabbi S. R. Hirsch put so little stress on kabbalistic teachings, and why was he so circumspect when he was drawing upon them? His claim in Letter Eighteen that he was uninitiated and therefore could not comment upon the teachings of Kabbalah reflects his humility rather than his actual limitations, for he was certainly familiar with the basic approach of Kabbalah; in fact, when still in his youth, he received the Zohar as a present from his grandfather who had great influence on him (Shemesh Marpeh, p. 276). Dayan Grunfeld suggests that Rabbi S. R. Hirsch side-stepped kabbalistic interpretations in favor of his ethical and symbolic approach because he felt that this would have greater appeal to his audience at large and would produce more clarity about the meaning of the mitzvos.

A more likely reason for his attitude was his strong concern (expressed later in this letter and in Letter Eighteen) about the misuse of kabbalistic ideas, which was prevalent then as now. There was always the danger of flight from rationality as well as of misunderstanding kabbalistic ideas. Kabbalah necessarily uses ordinary language, expressions and concepts to describe profound and otherworldly ideas and processes. All too many people exposed to a smattering of kabbalistic ideas understand this language in its literal sense, fail to grasp the deeper meaning and profound perceptions hidden behind it, and are left with simplistic and crude materialistic and anthropomorphic ideas about matters that are purely spiritual. Prayers and practices designed to lift the individual to great heights become mere incantations and mechanical efforts to manipulate God's universe. It was these concerns that caused Torah leaders to prohibit the study of Kabbalah before a man had

reached a mature age.

Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's avoidance of mystical and otherworldly speculation does not, however, indicate a denial of kabbalistic ideas. His ethical interpretations of the *mitzvos* and of Judaism in general merely represented emphasis on a different aspect of the Torah's teachings which complements the kabbalistic approach, rather than contradicting it. Both Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's approach to *mitzvos* (which follows in the path of many earlier Torah thinkers) and the kabbalistic approach stress that all human action produces effects. They differ only in that the kabbalistic approach emphasizes the effects on the whole universe, whereas the other approach underlines the effect on the doer and his world (see n5 below). (For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Dayan Grunfeld, IH, pp. cxx ff.; and Jakob Rosenheim, pp. 63ff.)

4. Basic outlines In this work, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch provides only the very briefest outline of his classification of the *mitz*-

Nineteen Letters, the Horeb was already completed, and it offers a detailed presentation of the six groups into which the author divides the mitzvos (omitting, however, a discussion of those mitzvos that do not apply nowadays, in exile). In his Foreword to the Horeb, the author stated that he would reexamine his interpretation of the spirit of the mitzvos; and in a new edition of the Horeb, prepared shortly before his death, he added, in a footnote, that the results of the reexamination could be found in his commentary on the Chumash. (For a summary of various previous efforts to classify mitzvos and a detailed description of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's six categories, see Dayan Grunfeld, IH, pp. lii-lixx.)

The purpose of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's classification is to highlight the general ideas that the various groups of mizvos convey to us and to provide a basis for understanding the individual mizzos in each group, and thereby to capture the spirit of the Law and help us appreciate its profundities, lest it become "a duty of men that has become a habit" (πυρος αναν μικα [Yeshayah 29:13]). The author, even while stressing the great importance of studying the reasons for the mizvos, seeks neither to provide a defense of the mizvos nor to justify their observance. As explained in note 1 above, they have to be observed, whether we find meaning in them or not, because they are God's Will. "God has enacted these laws, whose Divine origin is sufficient reason for observing them" (Horeb, §441; see also the Foreword to the Horeb, pp. clv-

clvi). In fact, even if a *mitzvah* makes perfect sense to us, that should not be the reason we observe it, for that would be tantamount to doing the bidding of our own intelligence, rather than submitting to God's Will (see L5n4, and n1 to this letter). On the other hand, if our mind finds fault with a *mitzvah*, or any detail about it, we do not have the right to change the law, for that would mean sitting in judgment on the Will of God, the Infinite Mind and Absolute Being (see IH, p. x; and *Horeb*, the end of §454).

Indeed, there has been strong opposition to any inquiry into the reasons for mitzvos. In Sanhedrin 21b the Talmud warns that it may influence our observance of mitzvos; and the Tur declared that we should "not seek reasons for the mitzvos, for they are ordinances of the King for us, even if we know no reason for them" (YD 181). We should be ready unconditionally to do God's Will, for our primary duty is acceptance of the yoke of God's rulership (kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim). Some of this unquestioning obedience may be lost if we speculate about the purpose of the mitzvos as we do them, even if this does not affect the manner in which we fulfill them or the respect that we have for them. Moreover, even though there is a general consensus that God's commandments all have profound meaning and purpose, not only are we unable to fathom the depth of God's thought but we may, in fact, arrive at misinterpretations and wrong ideas.

Yet the Talmud as well as later Rabbinic authorities provide support for inquiry into the spirit of the *mitzvos* (see *Pesachim* 119a; and see Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's first note to Letter Eighteen, as well as CD 24:17). As the Rambam states, the laws of the Torah "are but counsel from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct the thoughts and set straight the actions" (*Hilchos Temurah* 4:13). To obey the law is crucial. At the same time, however, as we meditate on it, we seek to understand and rethink God's thoughts as expressed and symbolized in the *mitzvos*: "Just because the Laws of the Torah are to the faithful Jew the laws of God, he strives...to trace in their underlying ideas the thoughts of the Divine Lawgiver, even as the devout Jewish scientist or historian tries to discern in the events and miracles of nature and history a revelation of God's wisdom and omnipotence" (Dayan Grunfeld, IH, p. lxxxvi; see also CT 119:155).

Rabbi S. R. Hirsch, it should be noted, followed in the footsteps of his great teacher, Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger, the author of *Aruch la-Ner*, who wrote that what is demanded of the Jew is *belief* in Torah and *mitzvos*, the *will* to observe them, and *action* in carrying them out, "and

after he has done so, it is man's duty to study and inquire, as far as his reason reaches, to understand the reasons for the Torah" (*Minchas Oni* on *Vayetze*; see also other statements by Rabbi Ettlinger, quoted by Yonah Emanuel in MVS, p. 179).

The Jew must remember at all times that his inquiries into ta'amei ha-mitzvos (the reasons, or purposes, of the mitzvos) represent his own speculations, necessarily tentative and uncertain in nature. However, precisely because our observance of the precepts must be totally independent of our speculation about them (see Aruch ha-Shulchan, YD 292:4), we have the fullest freedom to meditate and arrive at our own conclusions about the message that the mitzvos aim to convey to us. At the same time, of course, there are some important considerations to be kept in mind, so that our speculations should not have the undesirable effects mentioned earlier.

from the mitzvah. meaning of ta'am as taste: we should taste, or sample, what we can gain sons). In fact, a popular chasidic explanation of the term is based on the search for the lessons found in the mitzvos (rather than for their reaclear, the study of ta'amei ha-mitzvos should probably be called a put forward are indeed reasons for the mitzvos involved. To make this B'chukkosay); and we cannot be sure at all that the explanations that we as far as our spiritual level permits (see Sefer ha-Chinnuch, the end of trate to ultimate and complete understanding of God's Word, but only to be approached with the greatest humility. We are not able to peneprofane things," but should cling to it in full faith, even if his yetzer and which he does not find a reason...should not be unimportant in his eyes understand their deepest meaning as far as he can. And something for his environment belittle it (Rambam, Hilchos Me'ilah 8:8). Torah has ...and he should not think about it as he would think about other, "A man should meditate on the judgments of the Holy Torah and First, we have to remember that we are dealing with God's Word.

It appears reasonable to say that our investigation of the *mitzvos* must be based on the halachic framework of each *mitzvah* in order for it to produce valid results; otherwise, the conclusions about the nature of the *mitzvah* might not be correct. Rabbi S. R. Hirsch actually insists that the explanation of a *mitzvah* must be guided by the fine halachic details of the *mitzvah*, and these will enable us to test the validity of our speculations. The Rambam declares that "those who trouble themselves to find the cause for any of these detailed rules [of a *mitzvah*] are in my eyes void of sense....The repeated assertions of our Sages that there are

halachic details of the mitzvos. to have held the view that explanations of mitzvos must accord with the points out that Rabbi Yeshayah Berlin (on Berachos 5:3) appears also not be grasped by our reason. Yonah Emanuel (MVS, pp. 176-77) they point to the exact purpose of these tools, which otherwise would molding the world. We must therefore pay attention to the details, as Hirsch, since he sees the mitzvos, in all their details, as tools for loyalty to God's Will. However, this does not satisfy Rabbi S. R. in the Rambam's view that these details are meant to test the Jew's punishment for transgression of these details. An answer can be found Rabbi S. R. Hirsch raises the question why, then, there should be is followed by Sefer ha-Chinnuch and by the Me'iri on Avos 3:14.) to the objective of every detail" (Moreh Nevuchim, III, 26). (This view reasons for all commandments...refer to their general purpose, and not

Laws [London: Soncino, 1972], vol. 1, pp. 3-25.) see Dayan Grunfeld, IH, pp. xcviii ff., and his work The Jewish Dietary 3:14). (For a fuller discussion of the inquiry into ta'amei ha-mitzvos, account. This point is made repeatedly by the Netziv (e.g., on Shemos division is ultimately untenable once we take the details of mitzvos into could not have been deduced by human reason alone, so that the entire is that this kind of division inspired the labeling of the latter group as 20:12) and also by Rabbi Ya'akov Kamenetzky (Emes l'Ya'akov, Avos the mitzvos in the former group have some halachic provisions that purely ceremonial rituals (see L17n3); but another reason is that even between sichliyos and shimiyos, rational and revealed laws. One reasor various ways of grouping mitzvos, but he never makes a distinction It should be noted in this context that Rabbi S. R. Hirsch mentions

5. Symbolic act One way of understanding the significance of the

essentially the approach of Kabbalah and of those who have drawn from be achieved in various ways: the lesson can be taught by the precept is the approach of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch (see n3 above). The impact can himself and on his earthly environment. This, as we have pointed out, negating the validity of the kabbalistic approach that has been described Chayim of Rabbi Chayim of Volozhin). On the other hand—and without it, notably in the chasidic world, but also outside it (see Nefesh haitself (e.g., not mistreating the widow or the orphan); it can be spelled -others have stressed the impact of the mitzvos on the individual how they trigger a Divine response to our earthly actions. This is mitzvos is to explore their impact on the universe and

> Egypt); or it can be conveyed through a symbolic action (e.g., shaking out in the precept (e.g., the obligation to remember the Exodus from

based on a denial of the Divine origin of the mitzvos. ethical or philosophical precepts, they label all the others "ceremonial nents of Torah observance. While these opponents may countenance kept intact" (Dayan Grunfeld, IH, p. lxii). This view is, of course long as the inward frame of mind and the right 'Gesinnung' [spirit] was laws"—a formalistic "outer shell which...could be discarded at will as this last group of commandments exercises a profound effect upon us. Yet these mitzvos in particular have come under attack from the oppo-In Letter Thirteen, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch explains the way in which

of course, much more effective if a person does dwell on it. commandment is not consciously aware of its message. However, it is, nation. This educational impact exists even if the one fulfilling the have as their particular aim the sanctification of the individual and the and asserts that these commandments, far from being empty rituals, the symbolic commandments, especially the Edos (see IH, pp. cvii-cxx), consider and ponder on this thought in all its scope and consequences" us stands to the thought which is to be expressed, and equally to upon to look for the relation in which the outward action prescribed for Divine precepts is particularly required in the case of those commandordained in the Torah that the Divine thought is first implanted in man" (p. clvii). Rabbi S. R. Hirsch notes the powerful educational impact of thought....In performing such commands we shall feel ourselves called ments...the object of which is in part to awaken in us certain trains of Hirsch stresses in the Foreword to the Horeb that "meditation about the 160ff.). In connection with these "symbolic actions," Rabbi S. R. the author's condemnation of the label "ceremonial laws," in GS, I, (JE, I, 93; see also JE, II, 88ff., 245ff.; CW, I, 183ff., 265ff.; and also essential, original and eternal, and it is "through these symbolic actions In contrast, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch emphasized that these precepts are

basic principles of symbolic interpretation, and in the second part he ism," now available in English as volume three of Hirsch's Collected Jeschurun a major work entitled "A Basic Outline of Jewish Symbolit must carefully consider all aspects of the mitzvah. During the years Writings. In the first part of this work, the author carefully defined the 1856-58, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch published in his monthly periodical no circumstances be arbitrary. As we pointed out in the previous note, Obviously, the interpretation of the "symbolic actions" must under

applied them to the mitzvos of milah, tzitzis, tefillin and the Sanctuary (see also Dr. I. Grunfeld, "Taamei Hamitzvoth," in Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breuer Jubilee Volume, ed. M. and J. Breuer [New York: Feldheim, 1962], pp. 95ff.; Rabbi David Zvi Hoffmann, Vayikra [Berlin: Poppauer, 1905], I, pp. 87ff.; and Rabbi J. Perlow, in LHL, pp. 85-88).

6. Aids to the practical observance The author points out a logical

distinction here. The interpretation of Torah laws given by God is based on all the minutiae of the law. In contrast, laws decreed by the Rabbis do not call for this kind of interpretation, for they were ordained only as practical aids to proper observance of the Torah laws. However, they too are part of the system of laws designed for the education and life of the Jew.

7. The sources See L2n6 and CS 21:2.

8. Man and Yisraelite This is the translation of the German composite

civilization based on the cultural and social values of a religiously inspired humanism which strives for human self-perfection. justice is to be carried out in accordance with the insights provided by of every man. (In fact, in his third footnote [note c] to Letter Five, every human being and that puts a general awareness of a Higher Being, the "inner revelation.") As a result, man is expected to develop a Rabbi S. R. Hirsch explains that the No'achide obligation to administer and even of the distinction between right and wrong, within the reach world. Man is aided in this task by the inner voice that speaks within proper place as God's premier servant in the work of perfecting His Creator and the Master of nature and history, and by assuming his Having lost Gan Eden, man is to regain it by learning to see God as the Hirsch's statements, in the earlier letters, about the task set to mankind. order to understand it properly, we have to bear in mind Rabbi S. R. familiarity with Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's writings has prompted many people to put forth their own, erroneous interpretations of this term. In role as "man developed to a higher plane by the guiding influence of the Torah"—the Jew as the prototype of the ideal human being. Lack of Hirsch uses in this letter and in other writings to describe the Jew in his term "Mensch-Yisrael," which Rabbi S. R.

Yet man's ability to perceive clearly the inner voice and to act on it is limited by his tempting impulses and instincts, as we explained previously. Consequently, his strivings and aspirations may, in the

worst case, cause him totally to ignore his duties to God, in favor of a secular and destructive atheism. In the best case, his efforts, though moving in the right direction, cannot and will not go far enough. Hence the need for the "outer revelation," entrusted to the Jewish people, to assure the attainment of God's goal in creating the world (see L3n3). "Culture in the service of morality is the first stage of man's return to God...and the Torah completes it; for the Torah is the most finished education of man" (CB 3:24, quoting the statement by Chazal that Derech Eretz preceded Torah by twenty-six generations). Humanism, in its highest form, is but a stepping-stone toward the higher conception of man as God's servant. Therefore, the Torah was required as the specific Law for the Jew, who was to keep the Divine ideal alive among mankind (see CB 1:11, 18:19).

The need for this revelation, which provided a clear statement of God's Will as well as the means to free ourselves from the shackles of our yetzer ha-ra, has been abundantly established by the course of world history (see L6n3). Rabbi S. R. Hirsch stressed that there have been chasidei ummos ha-olam, among the nations, who "had in their hearts—and gave voice to—the seeds of human enlightenment, pending its final victory, and served as heralds of truth, goodness and beauty" (GS, VI, 315-16). This was the point of his famous speech in tribute to the German poet Friedrich Schiller. But these were voices in the wilderness.

the self-gratification of the elite could exist side by side with the misery sensuality and empty superficiality marked the Greek world. As a result, the motive and measure of Greek striving for perfection; a beguiling salvation of mankind. Man's own gratification and sense of grace were truth that is needed in order to achieve the right way of life and the own reasoning and insight, man perceived only a small fraction of the it helped lay the foundation for human progress. But, relying on his extent that Hellenism held up the ideal of civilized, joyful and free man, and world, he had to emphasize their dark side (CW, II, 201ff.). To the when Rabbi S. R. Hirsch turned to an analysis of the Hellenistic spirit ultimately determined what he considered to be moral and right. Thus, carbon copies of man; and man's own desires and self-indulgence the source of all values. As a result, even the gods were viewed as mere this idealism set up man as the measure of all things, and his reason as more positive aspects of Hellenistic culture, notably its idealism. Yet, characterized the Roman world, and he underlined, in contrast, the Hirsch strongly criticized the crude materialism and hedonism that In his study "Judaism and Rome" (CW, II, 275ff.), Rabbi S. R.

<u>5. באורו: הראי'ה קוק זצ'ל</u>

הַמַּצְשִׁיּוּת הַמְרָבָּה בַּתּוֹרָה — רְבּוּי הַתּוֹרָה וְהַמִּצְוֹוֹת — בָּאָה מְתּוֹךְ אוֹתָה הַשְּּכִיעָה הַגְּּדוֹלָה שֶׁל לְשַׁדִּיּוּת הַחַיִּים הַפְּנִימִיִּים, שֶׁל מְקוֹרִיּוּת הַשְּאִיפָה הָעָדִינָה, שֶׁל הַמְּרוֹמִים הָאֱלֹהִיִּים הַמַּקִּיפִים אֶת כּל וּמְמַלְאִים אֶת כּל אֲשֶׁר לְאוֹר הַתּוֹרָה וּלְגַשְׁמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל. אוֹתוֹ הַמְּלוּי הַשׁוֹטֵף, טָעוּן הוּא כֵּלִים רַבִּים לְקַבֵּל אֶת שִׁפְעוֹ, וִמְתּוֹךְ כָּדְּ הַמַּעְיָן חוֹזֵר וְשׁוֹטֵף, חוֹזֵר וְנוֹבֵעַ

הַפִּינוּת לֹא הֵבִינָה אֶת זֹאת, הִיא חָשְׁבָה שֶׁהַפֵּעֲשִׁים בָּאוּ מִתּוֹןּ הָענִי, מִתּוֹךְּ אִי־הַיְּכְלֶת לַעֲלוֹת עֲלִיֶּה רוּתָנִית — אֲבָל זוֹ הִיא טָעוּת יְסוֹדִית בְּיָחַשׁ לְכְלָלוּת הָאֻמָּה יְשֶׁטֶף נִשְׁמָתָה. וְאַף לַפְּרָטִים הַנְּחֲשָׁלִים בְּאָרְחוֹת הַחַיִּים וְכִשְׁרוֹן הַקּנָשׁ, מְשַׁמְשִׁים הַפֵּעֲשִׁים הַחִיצוֹנִיִּים לְמַדְרֵגוֹת לַעֲלוֹת עַל יָדָם אֶל הַפּּנָימִי, וּבְּזֶה יִתְאַגְּרוּ גַּם אֵלֶה גַּם אֵלֶה אֶל הַפְּלָל כֻּלוֹ, הַמְּלֵא רְנָיָה גְּרוֹלָה, עַד שֶׁהַשְּׁטֶף מַבְרָח לָצֵאת בְּצִנּוֹרוֹת רַבִּים.

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אֵין ענֶג וְשִּמְחָה לָאָדָם בַּצְשׁוֹתוֹ מֵעְשִׁים, כִּי אָם אַחֲרֵי שֶׁמְצֵיֶּר בִּלְּכָבוֹ הֵיטֵב מַּבֵלִיתָם, וּכְפִי יְדִיעָתוֹ הַטּוֹבָה הַצּוֹמֵחַת מִמַּצְשִׁיו. כֵּן תִּרְבֶּה שִּמְחָתוֹ בָּהֶם. וּמֵאֲשֶׁר הַשִּּמְחָה וְנָחַת־הָרוּחַ שֻׁנִּמְצֵאת בַּלֵב עַל יְרֵי הַמַּעֲשִׁים. הִיא הַסִּבְּה הָעְקָרִית לְהַתְּמָדָה עֲלֵיהֶם, כִּי הָאָדָם כּוֹמַף לְאוֹר וְצָהָלָה מִשֶּׁבַע נַפְשׁוֹ הַשְּׁכְלִית. וּבוֹרֵחַ מִתּוּגָה וְקַדְרוּת, עַל כֵּן ״אֵיזֶהוּ חָכָם הָרוֹאָה אֶת הַנּוֹלָד״. כִּי כָּל מַה שֶּׁיִתְבָּרֵר לוֹ יוֹתֵר הַטּוֹב הַנּוֹלָר מִמִּצְשִׁיוּ, כֵּן יַגְּדִּיל וְיֵאִדִּיר אֶת הַשְּׁלָמָתִם.

עַל כֵּן נְצְטַנִּינוּ לַעֲשׁוֹת אֶת מַעֲשֵׁה הַמִּצְוֹוֹת בְּשִׂמְחָה, כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּבְּ
״חַחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא עָבַרְהָּ אֶת ד׳ אֱלֹהֶיף בְּשִׁמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב״ (דְּבָרִים כח, מז).
וּמְאֹד נֵדַע כִּי כָּל מַה שֶּׁחְצֵוֵנוּ הַתּוֹרָה עַל דָּבָר הַתְּלוּי כַּלֵב, אֵין כַּנְּנָחָה שֶׁנְּקְנָה שְׁנִּקְנָה שְׁנָקְבָּה עָלְיו, כִּי זָה אִינוֹ בִּכְלֵל הַבְּּחִינָה, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁבְּטִבְּעָם לְמַקְנוֹת לָנוּ הַיִּלְאָה מְמֶנוּ עָלָיו, כִּי זָה אִינוֹ בִּכְלֵל הַבְּּחִינָה, וּכְמוֹ שֶׁבְּטִבְעָם לְהַקְנוֹת לָנוּ הַיִּלְאָה מְמֶנוּ עָלִיו, דְּהַיְינוּ לְמוּד הַתּוֹרָה נַחְלָּקְיהָ נִיִּיעַת שְּבְּבָר וּמְדוֹת טוּבוֹ, שֶעַל־יְבֵי הַיִּייְנוּ לְמוּד הַתּוֹרָה בְּאֵלֶה הָבוֹא הַיִּרְאָח הְצְבְיִי הַשֵּׁם יִתְבָּרָף וֹהְבּּעָבָר אָת ה׳ בְּשִׁמְחָה, גַּם כֵּן הַפַּנָנָה עַל הַהִשְּׁתַּדְּלוּת יְנִה בְּבִילְ אֶת הַיּבְּרָה וְהָבְּיִי הַשְּׁמְהָבְּר, וְיִה בְּעִבר אָת ה׳ בְּעִבְיה בַּמְינָה לַנִּה בָּרוֹיָה בְּאָלָה הָבוֹיְה בְּעֵבְיה הַשְּׁכְּית מֵהְתֹּבְּרָה וְהָשְּמְדְּבִי הַשְּׁמְרָת הַבּנְנְבְיה בְּעָבְיה לְשָׁב בְּיוֹר לְעֲבֹד אָת ה׳ בְּבְרוֹיָה הְשָּבְנָה עַל הַהִּשְׁתַּדְּלְת הַבְּבְּנִה לְעָבד אָת הְיה הְבְּבוֹר וְהָשְּבְינָה לְשְׁמֹה בָּבָי, כִּים בְּיִבְעם בְּבָבְינִים הְשָּבֶּים מְבָּנְה לַבְּים הְשָּבְּר בְּיבְעָּבְים הְשָּבְּת בְּבָּנְבְים הְשָּבְּת מְהִיבְּים הְשִּבְּת בְּעבְינָת הְשָּבְית הְבּבְינָה בְּבָּיבְ הְשִּבְּה בְּעְבִים הְשָּבְּת בְּבִיבְיּת הְשָּב בְּר בִּיִים בְּמָבְּת בְּבִיבְיּים בְּתְּבְּבְים הְּבָּבְינִים בְּיִבְים בְּיִבְּים בְּיבְּבְּיִבְּת בְּבָּבְיִים בְּיִבְּנִים בְּבְּבְיבְיִים בְּבִינְים בְּינִה בְּעְבְיבוּת בְּיִבְּיבּים בְּבִיבְים בְּבּיב בְּיִבְעבֹיב הְיִבְיבְיב בְּיב בִּי אִם לַצְעֵבְיב הְם הְבּבְּר, בְּי אִם לַנְצֵעְרָת הִּבְּבְּבְּבְרָב בְּבּבְיב בְּיבְיב בִּיב בְּי בְּב בְּיִב בְּיִב הְיּבְּבְּיִים בְּבְּיִים בְּיבְיבְים בְּיִים בְּבְּבְיִים בְּיִבְּים בְּיִים בְּיּבְיבְּיִים בְּיִים בְּיִים בְּיִים בְּבְיבְיים בְּבְילְיוּים בְּיוֹים בְּבְּיִים בְּיִים בְּיִים בְּיוֹים בְּיִים בְּבְּיבְּים בְּיּים בְּיוּים בְּיִים בְּבְּיב בְּבְיּים בְּיּבְיבְּים בְּיִים בְּיִים בְּיוֹי בְי